“‘”Breach’” of a contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act that it has contractually promised to perform.’ Under terms of the agreement, Hinojosa merely agreed to allow the first $258,996.16 in proceeds from the sale to go to LaFredo with any remaining proceeds to be split between them. LaFredo does not identify any action taken by Hinojosa that precluded him from receiving any of the proceeds from the sale. To the contrary, the record before us suggests LaFredo received all the available proceeds, used a portion to pay for the Canton Street condominium, and signed a settlement…

After a supreme court opinion earlier this year, the Fifth Court revisited the question whether PNC’s effort to foreclose a subrogation lien claim was time-barred. It held: Accrual. Recognizing that “Texas case law gives conflicting answers to this issue,” the Court concluded that “the correct result is the one first reached by Kone in 1927. The lender’s cause of action to enforce its subrogation lien rights accrues on the date the refinancing loan matures.” (citing Kone v. Harper, 297 S.W. 294 (Tex. App.–Waco 1927, aff’d, 1 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928)). Limitations period.  The Court applied the four-year statute that governs…

The allegedly overlapping fraud and contract claims in Benge General Contracting v. Hertz Electric were as follows: “Appellees’ breach-of-contract counterclaim was based on ‘enforceable agreements’ under which appellees agreed to provide ‘electrical contracting and painting services at several jobsites in North Texas’ in exchange for BGC’s promise to compensate appellees for the services.” “Their fraud counterclaim, as stated in appellees’ fourth amended counterclaims, was based on Dennie’s reliance [on] Benge’s allegedly false representation that he would pay for work performed by appellees ‘in exchange for the signing of lien releases.’ Appellees alleged that appellants knew the representations were false when…